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Abstract
This article provides a general analysis of competition law and then focuses on competi-
tion-related issues within public contracts. First and foremost, the article tries to highlight 
the economic grounds that led to the introduction of laws to protect competition, as a 
functional tool for production efficiency. After a critical analysis of national and EU regu-
lations on competition, the article analyses the relation between competition and public 
contracts, by making a distinction between a “micro” and a “macro” view of competition. 
The article aims at highlighting the main features of the code of public contracts, focusing 
also on the relation between two different principles: the protection of EU competition, 
on the one side, and the power of member states to determine their internal organisation, 
on the other side. The article also aims at understanding to what extent can the European 
Union protect free competition without affecting the organisational freedom of its mem-
ber states.
Keywords: competition, antitrust, competition law, public contracts, antitrust 
legislation
1. Introduction
In a wide sense, competition indicates a market situation with wide freedom of access to 
entrepreneurial businesses, with the possibility of free choice for buyers (in particular, con-
sumers) and, in general, the possibility for each to exploit the best opportunities available on 
the market, or to propose new opportunities, without impositions on the part of the state or 
restrictions imposed by coalitions of enterprises. Competition is protected by a series of pro-
visions, generically defined as antitrust provisions, which discipline relations between entre-
preneurs and which allow the regular execution of competitive relationships.
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
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In economy, competition is the condition in which several companies compete on the same 
market, understood as the ideal meeting place between demand and offer, producing the 
same goods or services (offer) which satisfy a number of buyers (demand). In competition no 
operator can influence the trend of negotiations by his own decisions.
To be able to speak of competition, it is necessary to verify the following requisites [1]:
• Large numbers of operators, both sellers and buyers.
• Freedom of entry or absence of barriers. If this requisite is not met, one must speak of im-
perfect competition.
• Product similarity. If this requisite is not met, one must speak of monopolistic competition.
• Perfect market information and transparency.
• Simultaneity of contracting, subsequent to a negotiating phase which allows all operators 
to obtain the necessary information.
There are different types, or degrees, of competition. One particular form is perfect competi-
tion: this refers to an ideal market condition in which the competition between the enterprises 
leads to a decrease in the purchase price which is equivalent to the marginal cost.
In perfect competition, every operator considers the price as a datum that cannot be modified. 
The market reaches a position of equilibrium when the transactions take place at the price 
that makes the quantity demanded and that offered equal, i.e. the equilibrium price [2]. The 
features of the equilibrium price are:
• Singleness: all the units of the product are sold at the same price.
• Existence: the equilibrium price must also be significant from the economic viewpoint; if 
the price did not cover the costs and allow for significant revenues, the merchandise would 
not even be produced.
• Stability: if spontaneously reached by negotiations, the price is stable; otherwise, the price is 
unstable, when the producers do not succeed in swiftly adjusting the offer, so that the price 
is destined to swing up and down forever.
Perfect competition is deemed as reached in an economic system if the demand and the offer are 
particularly elastic, so that the price of a product or service tends to be close to the marginal cost.
However, it has been the topic of in-depth debate, and today it is considered purely utopian, 
whereas an imperfect competition seems concretely achievable (so-called reasonable competi-
tion), in which the price decreases towards the marginal cost but without reaching it.
The concept of competition was developed by the critics of mercantilism as of the second half 
of the eighteenth century, as a natural result of the fundamental freedom of the individual, 
in contrast to a state-controlled economy in which the state determines what and how much 
is produced.
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Various advocates of classic economy maintained that the market could autonomously regu-
late itself [3].
Others stated that competition can alone regulate the mechanisms of the economy and, fur-
thermore, that the individual, pursuing his individual interest, also benefited the society as a 
whole [4].
According to the economists of the neoclassical school, the main advantages for the economy result-
ing from competition can be summed up in two main aims: the maximum increase of the quality/
price ratio of the goods and services (through the optimisation of the production factors) and the 
elimination (through competition) of the competitors that are unable to achieve the first aim.
Always, according to the neoclassic theory, competition eliminates profit that has not been 
earned, thus ensuring an important factor of social justice.
The above-illustrated theories were the subject of strong criticism and denial already towards 
the end of the eighteen century, when it was shown that the theory of pure competition would 
be valid only in static situations and therefore could not be applied in practice in the analysis 
of real economies, which are dynamic by definition [5].
The Marxian interpretation of competition is radically different. According to this theory, 
perfect competition regards only the relationship of force between capitalists and does not 
eliminate the exploitation of the workers [6].
2. The community antitrust legislation
The term antitrust identifies that complex of legal provisions that regulate and favour free 
competition in the market. Antitrust legislation therefore has the purpose of preventing com-
panies from adopting strategies that allow them to assume anticompetitive positions or to 
stipulate collusive agreements to the prejudice of the consumer. However, these same pro-
visions are also a policy tool and, therefore, subject to the opinions and choices of policy in 
general. Antitrust is an institution with deep roots in history and in society [7].
The purpose of antitrust legislation is to sustain a free market economy, where every enter-
prise takes its own decisions independently of its competitors, in order to guarantee strong 
competition which leads to a more efficient distribution of goods and services, lower prices 
of the same and their higher quality and maximum innovation. Competition therefore plays a 
role of primary importance since it encourages the various operators on the market to obtain 
the maximum result possible and to then select those that are most efficient.
The main modern legislations are the result of the affirmation of economic liberalism which 
has produced two effects: on the one hand, the suppression of state-imposed restrictions on the 
economy, and on the other hand, the ban on enterprises to abuse dominant positions to the preju-
dice of competitors and consumers.
The first modern antitrust law was the Sherman Act, passed in the United States in 1890, for the 
purpose of prohibiting cartel conduct and attempts to monopolise the market [8]. In 1914 the 
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Clayton Act [9] was added to that first body of rules, to regulate the phenomena of corporate 
concentrations, followed by the Federal Trade Commission Act which punishes conduct that 
is generically defined as “unfair” and which is applied in parallel to the Sherman Act. The dif-
ference between the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act is of nature and of 
purpose: the criminal nature of the antitrust bans enshrined in the former, and the consequent 
punitive nature of the antitrust control carried out in application of these rules, compared to a 
form of administrative control over behaviour and antitrust action that favours the corrective-
restorative aspect.
This American experience paved the way for Europe to create provisions to protect market 
competition, although the first provisions were adopted several decades later than in the 
United States, only after the end of the Second World War. Only then were the conditions ripe 
for the creation of the European Single Market, overcoming the political visions of the diverse 
countries based, above all, on interventionism and protectionism [10].
In Europe, a single system of antitrust control was adopted only in 1957, with the introduc-
tion into the Treaty of Rome of specific provisions to protect competition, focusing on the 
discipline of restrictive agreements, the abuse of dominating positions and state aid. In 1989, 
with a specific regulation [11], a specific set of rules was introduced for the antitrust control 
of concentration operations.
The noncompetition discipline is an essential element of European integration inasmuch as it 
must allow companies to compete at par conditions on the markets of all the member states, 
ensure the competitiveness of their products and services at the global level and, at the same 
time, protect the European consumers in the best way. The provisions on competition are 
contained in Arts. 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [12], 
which regard national provisions on corporate activities.
The competition policy is divided into two main aspects: on the one side, it provides for con-
trolling companies’ behaviour regarding agreements and concentrations, and on the other 
side, it provides for limiting state aid to national producers. The implementation of the EU 
policy on competition is the responsibility of the European Commission, with control jurisdic-
tion reserved to the European Court of Justice. The member states are obliged to harmonise 
national legislation to the EU legislation.
In 1957 most of the member states had a competition policy, but the methods and intensity 
of the control differed greatly from one country to another. The creation of a standardised 
economic area could not be limited to the coexistence of the various national practices, but 
the differences between national legislations were too deep to be replaced by a uniform com-
munity legislation. National and community competition policies had to coexist.
A general principle of community policy on this issue is the ban on agreements between com-
panies that have the purpose or the effect of preventing, limiting or distorting competition 
within the common market and can prejudice trade between the member states. Agreements 
on the prices of goods produced and placed on the market, agreements on the regions and 
areas where the products will be sold or distributed and agreements on the quantities to be 
produced are expressly banned.
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The Treaty bans the abuse of dominant positions on the common market (or on a substantial 
portion of the same) on the part of one or more companies where this can be prejudicial to trade 
between the member states. It therefore only sanctions the exploitation of a dominant position 
after the fact and does not allow the institutions of the union to control the concentration process.
On the control of state aid, the Treaty states, without allowing for exceptions, that state aid 
which distorts competition is incompatible with a common market. Political realism has 
prevented the use against the countries of the rigid wording adopted against companies, 
admitting that aid can be considered compatible (always providing that it does not alter the 
conditions of trade in a manner contrary to the common interest) if it is destined to facili-
tate the development of certain activities or certain economic regions, if it is to promote the 
execution of important projects of common European interest and, lastly, in the case of other 
categories of aid, if it is determined by a council decision.
To eliminate the distortions of competition, the Treaty regulates the selective measures of 
aid in favour of companies and specifies the general measures in favour of the economy that 
can turn out to cause distortion of competition. In the Treaty there is no distinction between 
private and public companies, and several community directives discipline the transparency 
of the public funds destined to the latter. The EU interventions aim to protect the competi-
tive functioning of the market on the basis of a general principle of a liberalist type, while the 
determination of what is concretely admissible is based on extensive pragmatism.
3. Protection of competition under Italian law
Under Italian law an organic discipline on competition was adopted with considerable delay 
compared to the other industrialised companies: Germany, the United Kingdom and France 
adopted the first laws on this issue towards the end of the 1940s, whereas the rules on compe-
tition within the European Community, as mentioned above, were already contained in the 
Treaty of Paris in 1952 and the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
The reasons for this delay are due to the fact that Italy, for a long time, pursued an economic 
model based on the idea that the state had to play a fundamental role in the direction and 
protection of the corporate system, with an outlook towards national economic development, 
in which companies, on the one hand, accepted the limitations to the freedom of economic 
independence, in exchange for a system that protected the results acquired by the companies 
existing in the market.
This model is present in the Civil Code of 1942, and it was also confirmed in the Constitution of 
1948 in Art. 41, which recognises and guarantees the right to economic initiative, ruling, in the 
first paragraph, that “Private economic initiative is free”. The Constitutional Court, until 1990, 
seconded this view, refusing to pronounce judgements of a liberalist tendency, except in certain 
important exceptions such as the pharmaceutical industry and the telecommunications field.
With the promulgation of Law No. 287 of 10 October 1990, better known as the Antitrust 
Law, a radical change of direction was implemented, under the influence of the ideology of 
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the free market, which dominates at the global level, and also according to the choices of the 
then European Community, more liberalist than initially. The Italian law swiftly approached 
the principles of free trade at the level of the legislation introduced. In this sense, the sudden 
introduction of the antitrust law occurred, but above all the principle of the protection of 
competition was introduced into the constitution in 2001 as well as the law to promote the 
competitive market in which parliament must approve every year.
However, if we consider the actual development of the legislation, we have to notice a much 
more uncertain process of development: the wealth of case law of the Constitutional Court has 
applied the principle of the protection of competition but restored the authority of the state 
instead of the regions, therefore, with purposes other than the original purposes of Art. 41.
The fact is that the principle of competition itself contains much ambiguity, because the 
model of market and of economy that is pursued would require many more clarifications 
and much more in-depth examination which both the letter of the law and the case law of the 
Constitutional Court are far from having achieved.
The real driving force that led Italy to adopt the provisions to protect competition was the cre-
ation of the European Single Market [13]. This gradually led to the introduction of new laws 
aimed at changing the role of the state, from manager to regulator. This change in state action 
represents what had already occurred at the European level, when the various countries tried 
to influence the market mechanisms, sometimes even substituting them and imposing the 
rules of the game. The regulator state, instead, according to what happened in the United 
States, played the super partes role of a severe regulator, supervisor and guarantor of trade 
relations. In both cases, the aim pursued was that of increasing the national economies, but in 
the first case, there were no great results inasmuch as the focus was more on the efficiency of 
the market rather than on operations to the advantage of competition.
Finally, with Law No. 287/1990 [14], Italian legislation also implemented the principles of com-
munity law, aimed at guaranteeing free competition which would allow for the creation of a 
European Single Market, avoiding possible abuse on the part of the operators. This definitively 
marked the change from a pro-intervention policy to a policy in favour of free competition. 
Thus, with this law, a constitutional value was protected, namely, the public interest/social 
usefulness contemplated by Art. 41 of the Constitution, which affirms the freedom of private 
economic initiative, consistent with the European context of which free competition, and the 
rules of its correct implementation perhaps represent the oldest and most solid pillar [15].
Right from its first article, Law No. 287/90 imposes the implementation of Art. 41 of the 
Constitution, thus affirming the right to a competitive market as a constitutionally protected 
right. A necessary consequence of this situation is the fact that public law now disciplines compe-
tition, for the first time in an objective sense, with a clear-cut reversal of the provisions of the civil 
code which, with regard to (unfair) competition, have the purpose of protecting the economic 
interests of the single entrepreneurs that may be harmed by competitors. The protection of com-
petition (and of the market understood as a unicum) structured so that it imposes rules on the 
companies on the market of reference (geographic or substantial) has a determining influence on 
the behaviour and choices of those who buy the goods or services produced by the companies.
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The main aims of the antitrust law, in addition to that of guaranteeing companies the freedom 
to operate on the market, include that of protecting consumers, favouring an improvement 
in product quality and innovation without excessive price increases. A specification must be 
made regarding the concept of company, which with this law takes on a wider meaning than 
that which can be drawn from the civil code, since company means any entity that practises 
an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and its method of financing itself [16].
For the civil code, however, the company can be defined as an economic activity aimed at the 
production or the exchange of goods and services that the entrepreneur practises by means 
of a complex of assets organised according to that activity (company). In addition, Law No. 
287/90 also rules that public companies or prevalently state-owned companies must be sub-
ject to the aforesaid discipline, according to Article 8. The European Court of Justice has also 
expressed its opinion on this point, affirming that the antitrust law must be excluded only 
when the activity practised by a public power falls within its institutional duties, thus not 
representing a corporate business [17].
For that matter, the second paragraph states that companies that operate as monopolies on 
the market or which manage services of general economic interest are also excluded from the 
application of the law. With regard to the comparison between Italian law and community 
law, Italian law, on the basis of paragraph 1 of Art. 1, seems to impose two restrictions. The 
first restriction is that of the “single barrier”, regarding the scope of application of national 
provisions which apply only if the fact does not fall within the scope of community law [18].
Therefore, national law is not applicable in the case of anticompetition effects that occur on 
the Italian market which are subject to community law because they involve the sphere of the 
single market. The second restriction regards the interpretation of the provisions, in which 
interpretation, as stated in paragraph 4 of Art. 1 of Law No. 287/90, “is based on the principles 
of the European Community law on competition” [19].
The Italian antitrust law has almost entirely adopted the European law. The cases of relevance 
for national law are those described in the European law on competition (except for state aid, 
disciplined only at the community level), and their rules substantially coincide, consequent to the 
precepts themselves which are mainly identical to the corresponding European provisions and 
to the special interpretative rule established by Art. 1, par. 4 of Law No. 287/1990, according to 
which national law must be interpreted and applied in conformity to the European laws in force.
The relevant cases are restrictive agreements, abuse of a dominant position and corporate 
concentrations.
The illegal agreements are agreements, agreed practices or decisions of associations of companies 
that have the purpose or the effect of preventing, limiting or falsifying competition on the national 
market. The unlawfulness of an agreement can be excluded when it fulfils all the conditions listed 
under Art. 4 of Law No. 287/1990. Unlawful agreements are to all effects null and void.
The ban on the abuse of a dominant position, however, aims to punish anticompetitive behav-
iour adopted by a company or companies with significant power on the market (abuse of an 
individual dominant position, in the first case, and abuse of a collective dominant position, 
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in the second case). The behaviour aimed at obtaining supra-competitive profits or other ben-
efits that cannot be obtained in a competitive situation (exploitation abuse) or at preventing 
the entry or the survival on the market of rival operators (impediment abuse) is abuse.
Concentrations of companies, however, are not in themselves banned, but they are subjected 
to a prior antitrust control procedure which can result in the companies being banned from 
carrying out the operation reported when it is found that this can create or reinforce a domi-
nant position on the market.
The responsibility for supervising the application of the antimonopoly legislation in Italy is 
attributed to Independent Administrative Authority, the antitrust authority that guarantees 
competition and the market (Italian abbreviation: AGCM). The functions that the said authority 
performs and the powers that it exercises differ according to whether the operations in question 
are to form concentrations, to enter into agreements or to abuse a dominant position. In the first 
case, the authority subjects the reported operation to a prior control which can conclude in the 
full and unconditioned authorisation of the said operation, a conditioned authorisation subject 
to compliance with certain prescriptions imposed by the authority or a ban on the execution of 
the operation. In the second case, instead, the authority, finding an infringement of the antitrust 
rules, orders the company to cease the prejudicial behaviour, possibly also prescribing specific 
types of behaviour or structural measures necessary to restore the competitive functioning of 
the market, and, in the more serious cases, it issues administrative sanctions.
The antitrust authority must also ensure the local application of the European antitrust provi-
sions. In this case, specific rules govern the coordination between the national authority and 
the commission.
The national authority’s power is not exclusive, however, inasmuch as the courts also have power 
in the case of lawsuits for nullity, claims for compensation for damages and petitions for urgent 
court orders in the case of anticompetition agreements, in compliance with Arts. 101-102 TFUE [20]. 
The maintenance of this “double track” of jurisdiction is justified by the fact that the antitrust 
authority and the ordinary courts must protect different interests and therefore their work must 
be considered separate and autonomous. As has been stated, “the public enforcement entrusted 
to the antitrust authority pursues, in the interests of society as a whole, the protection of competi-
tion as a constitutionally protected form of market, whereas the need to protect the interests of 
private subjects prejudiced by the anticompetition behaviour of companies is achieved by the 
adoption of the provisions set out in Art. 33 of Law 287/90 by the ordinary courts” [21].
4. The tools for the promotion and protection of competition in 
public contracts
Competition has a direct impact on the law on public contracts and contributes to defining the 
field of application. This holds true for both the objective and the subjective spheres of the rules.
With regard to the first aspect, importance is taken on by the procedure of exemption from the 
application of the European provisions on public contracts relative to special sectors, aimed at 
ascertaining whether the activity “is directly exposed to competition on the freely accessible 
markets” [22].
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The special sectors are those of electricity, gas, water, transport, ports and airports and the 
postal system, in which elements of natural monopoly are present (infrastructures that are, 
in antitrust jargon, essential facilities). For this reason they are not subject to European sector 
discipline, usually administered by independent authorities and regulations, aimed at creat-
ing the legal conditions to open the sector to competition [23].
The model is based on the idea that if one of the sectors is subjected to the same competitive 
pressure of nonregulated markets, this eliminates the risk of the operators’ purchasing pol-
icy being distorted by noneconomic factors. Therefore, the special rules that oblige contract-
awarding bodies to respect the several times mentioned European principles of par condicio 
and of transparency and publicity become superfluous [24].
The exemption procedure is in the hands of the European Commission and involves an 
assessment between the market of the activity in question, of the geographic market of refer-
ence and of the full implementation and application of the sector legislation of the union. The 
criteria to assess the competition of the market are laid down by the provisions of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, and they include “the features of the products or 
services in question, the existence of alternative products or services that can substitute the 
former on the demand or the offer side, the prices and the effective or potential existence of 
the products or services in question” [25].
An exemption request must be made by a single member state (but also, if allowed by 
national legislation, by the single contract-awarding body), and it must contain informa-
tion on all the pertinent circumstances, including the state of implementation of the sector 
European legislation, in order to demonstrate that access to the market “is free in fact and 
in law” [26]. In the procedure, an assessment may be obtained from the independent super-
visory authority.
To sum up, the market analysis tools typical of antitrust law influence, according to the results 
of the assessment which not by chance is in the hands of the European Commission appointed 
to apply the antitrust laws, the field of application of European law on public contracts. The 
sector of activity, to which an exemption provision is applied on the result of the above-
described procedure, always remains, as is also the case for the deregulated markets, subject 
to “the application of the legislation on competition” [27].
A similar important justification holds firm to also delimit the subjective profile of European 
law on public contracts, which is to say the European notion of a public law body, already 
present in the Public Contract Code and also in the packet of the European directives [28].
As it is known, the public law bodies are included among the “contract-awarding administra-
tions”, i.e. the public administrations in the strict sense (countries, territorial bodies, noneco-
nomic bodies, etc.) to which the stricter publicity rules are applied because there is a greater 
risk of the purchasing policy being conditioned by noneconomic reasons [29].
The public law body is identified on the basis of three parameters: it must have legal personal-
ity, whether it is public or private; it must be subject to a dominating influence on the part of a 
public administration; and it must have been established to satisfy needs of general interests 
of a non-industrial and non-commercial nature, i.e. as a rule it produces public goods or pub-
lic services according to a non-market logic.
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Above all, this last parameter has given rise to interpretative uncertainties and varying case 
law interpretations, sometimes more extensive and sometimes more restrictive [30].
As clarified by Directive 2014/24/EU, it must be maintained, on the basis of the case law of the 
European Court of Justice, that a subject is not a public law body if “it operates under normal 
market conditions, it aims to make a profit and it sustains the losses that may result from the 
practice of its business” [31]. If these elements exist, it is licit to suppose that the subject has 
been created to satisfy needs of general interest that are, in fact, of an industrial and com-
mercial nature.
Also, in this case, it is essential to verify the factual and legal context in which the subject oper-
ates. The fact that the economic operator operates in a fully competitive context is a highly 
relevant element albeit not decisive in itself [32].
In fact, for the economic operator to be encouraged to make purchases aimed at selecting 
the competitor that offers the best conditions, it is first necessary to ascertain whether it is 
exposed to an effective competitive pressure, i.e. whether it is an operator “on the market”. 
In addition it is necessary to assess whether the risk of losses deriving from bad manage-
ment falls entirely on the company or if the losses are perhaps neutralised by lists and items 
charged to society as a whole. If this second condition is not met, the operator “on the market” 
cannot be considered “of the market”, i.e. motivated by the same incentives as those of all the 
other operators.
In any case, the analysis of the market according to the techniques precisely of antitrust law 
is an essential tool to establish whether an economic operator can be qualified as a public law 
body and as such held to respect the rules imposed by European and national legislation on 
public contracts.
The contractual activity of a public administration, like a market operator, has many special-
ised features compared to the discipline normally applicable to agreements between private 
subjects. Some public contractual events can represent a danger for the need to protect com-
petition and the equal competitive opportunities of the various private subjects interested in 
being contractual counterparties to a public administration.
There are two topics strictly connected to the administration’s role on the market. The first 
topic regards the fact that acting publicly—inspired by logics of protecting the public inter-
est—conditions the institutes and discipline of common law applicable to contracts between 
private subjects. The second topic regards the risk of possible alterations in the competitive 
balance of the market by mechanisms that allow for avoiding procedures of public evidence.
For the coexistence of the various interests that a public administration meets in its service to 
society as a whole, the fundamental concept of public interest must be redefined. The concept 
must include the principle of the protection of competition as well as all those guarantees for 
private subjects introduced by national and community law, which could seem an obstacle 
and a limitation to the effective pursuit of the specific purpose precisely of an administration 
that acts as a market operator. In fact, if the public interest is considered in terms of interest 
for the whole society, it is simpler and more correct to consider as functional to the overall 
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efficiency of the administrative activity also the pro-competition laws underlying the selec-
tion of the public administration’s economic counterparties and the introduction of rules that 
prevent the contract-awarding bodies from unilaterally avoiding the contractual restrictions 
and the responsibilities that bear on every market operator, by exploiting authoritative pow-
ers that take on the semblance of intolerable privileges if used to alter the balance of equal 
relations imposed by private law.
European and national law on public contracts [33] answers, among other things, the need to 
ensure transparency and equal conditions among the operators of the markets of reference. 
Both the bidders in tender procedures and the economic operators of the connected markets 
have the right [34] to pretend that the administration acts in a manner to ensure transparency 
and equal conditions and, therefore, the said operators are entitled to impugn the deeds of a 
call for tenders that does not respect that right [35].
The rules of public evidence thus take on a pro-competitive function. Consequently, the 
implementation provisions of these rules, when they do not achieve the said purposes, simul-
taneously breach the rules themselves and the principles of free competition.
From another aspect, it must be noted that a call for tenders and the following procedure 
delimit a specific market within the wider market of reference, and that in one case as in the 
other, the bordering markets up- and downstream are involved, in which free competition in 
relation to the purchase of goods and services instrumental to the performance, being goods 
and services inferred in the tender procedure, must also be safeguarded. Consequently, if 
the deeds that discipline the tender procedure (calls for tenders, specifications, regulations, 
etc.) require the bidders to equip themselves, for the contractual activity, with machines or 
apparatuses that have certain features for the purpose of admission to the bidding or to be 
awarded a higher score, the principle of the equality of the bidders is prejudiced and, at the 
same time, competitive parity among the companies that produce the goods with which they 
must equip themselves.
Consequently, the prejudiced companies will be entitled to request protection also from the 
administrative courts [36].
The said principle is also based on the freedom of economic activity sanctioned by Art. 41 of 
the Constitution and on the connected freedoms of establishment and of the circulation of 
goods and of services, legalised by the TFUE, which must be respected by the member states, 
which, as it is known, must “adopt every general or specific measure to ensure compliance 
with the obligations of the Treaty or consequent to deeds of the Union’s institutions”, while 
they must “abstain from any measure which risks prejudicing the achievement of the Union’s 
objectives” [37].
The protection of competition must now be considered the main task of the countries [38].
As it is known, these freedoms depend on the principles and rules, both European and national, 
aimed at creating and maintaining a free and openly competitive market [39], which must be 
respected, also and above all, by the nations [40], which, therefore, must conform their action, 
including that concerning the purchase of goods and services supplied by private companies.
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It is now confirmed not only that the Public Contract Code also aims at reaching the objec-
tives of protecting and promoting competition [41] but also at guaranteeing that com-
petition represents the primary aim of the law on the awarding of public contracts [42]. 
Consequently, the contract-awarding body must also play a primary role in regulating and 
guaranteeing the market: the law on public contracts, over time and especially since the 
early 1990s, not only bans public administrations from abusing their dominant position, 
which, for obvious reasons, they occupy on the public contract market in general and in 
those “created” by the single-award procedures, in particular, but also requires that they 
exercise their functions and powers in a manner that ensures, first and foremost, competi-
tion “for the market” [43].
Article 101 and following of the TFUE in fact generate individual subjective legal situations 
worthy of protection against all legal subjects, which can be claimed not only for their nature 
of fundamental rights but also under Art. 33 of Law No. 287/1990, which entrusts to the Code 
of Administrative Procedure the discipline of legal protection in the case of the breach of the 
provisions of the said law, in parallel to civil lawsuit for nullity and for compensation pursu-
ant to Art. 33, par. 2, cited above.
This is also confirmed by Art. 21-bis of Law No. 287/1990 which, in recognising the anti-
trust authority’s right to sue, offers not only a case of extraordinary and exclusive legiti-
misation but also a power to act which, until now, was allowed only to private subjects 
prejudiced by a public authority’s actions which breached the rules imposed to safeguard 
competition and the market [44]. The question of the nature of the interest that the anti-
trust authority holds can perhaps be solved starting from the consideration that said 
authority’s right to sue, based on the public interest in repressing conduct which harms 
the principles which protect competition and the market, presumes that, normally, such 
a right is held by companies which suffer subjective prejudice due to the administration’s 
anticompetition conduct, inasmuch as operating on markets influenced by the effects of 
such conduct.
The joint expenditure procedures, aimed at limiting corruption, are essential to guarantee the 
transparent, impartial and economic management of public funds, to the benefit of society 
as a whole and to the benefit of the quality and efficiency of the public administrations. The 
public evidence procedures represent the main tool to ensure the correct execution of free 
competition between the market operators that offer the public administrations labour, ser-
vices and supplies.
The New Public Contract Code expressly contemplates, under Art. 30, that “The assignment 
and execution of contracts for works, labour, services, supplies and concessions guarantees 
the quality of the performance and respects the principles of economy, efficiency, timeli-
ness and correctness. In awarding contracts and concessions, the awarding bodies must also 
respect the principles of free competition, non-discrimination, transparency, proportional-
ity and of publicity. The awarding bodies cannot speciously limit competition in any man-
ner in order to unduly favour or prejudice certain economic operators nor, in the procedure 
for awarding concessions, may they speciously influence the estimate of the value of certain 
works, supplies or services. The criteria for participating in tender procedures must not be 
such as to exclude the micro small and medium companies”.
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The Public Contract Code also provides for many pro-competition institutions aimed at guaran-
teeing competition. These include the framework agreement, the electronic tender, the competi-
tive procedure with negotiation, the competitive dialogue and the partnership for innovation.
Public administrations can influence the competitive functioning of the markets when they choose 
from among the various methods of assigning the service, work or supply and downstream of that 
choice, when preparing the call for tenders and/or the pre-information notices and the tender spec-
ifications, by reporting suspect cases and by collaborating with the contract-awarding bodies and 
the antitrust authority. The methods that the public administrations can use to efficiently satisfy 
their needs are the public evidence procedure or direct assignment, also known as in-house pro-
vision, within the strict limits established by community and national legal theory and case law.
The effects on competition of the organisation solution chosen by a public administration to 
efficiently satisfy its aims differ according to the “choice” adopted. In fact, in the case of the 
in-house provision of a service, competition is entirely excluded, whereas in the case of the 
assignment of the service to a company which is partly privately owned, the market rules, and 
therefore the tender procedure rules, must be respected.
The calls for tenders and the specifications must therefore be conceived in a manner such as 
to create the “pre-conditions” so that the comparison between the participating companies is 
based on criteria of non-discrimination, proportionality and transparency, as well as on the 
principle of the widest possible participation.
The New Code No. 50 of 2016, under Art. 51, expressly contemplates that the contract-award-
ing bodies, to favour access on the part of micro, small and medium enterprises, may divide 
the contract into lots according to function or performance. The value of the lots must be suf-
ficient to guarantee the effective possibility of participation on the part of the micro, small and 
medium enterprises. In fact, the contract-awarding bodies are forbidden to break down the 
work into lots solely to avoid the application of the provisions of the Code or to award the con-
tract by the specious aggregation of contracts. The awarding bodies must also explain why a 
contract is not divided into lots. In spite of this provision, the specious division of the contract 
into several lots on the part of an administration may occur. This mechanism may be to avoid 
the tender procedure obligations. According to the antitrust authority, for an effective com-
parison between the companies, the number of lots must be less than the number of bidders.
Above all, although the pro-competition purpose of temporary groupings of enterprises is well 
known, the antitrust authority has found that this tool Above all, although the pro-competition 
purpose of temporary groupings of enterprises is well known, the Antitrust Authority has 
found that this tool “must always be checked as to whether it is suitable in practice, since it can 
easily lead to a decrease in the degree of competition, if it allows subjects, which could partici-
pate independently, to make a joint bid with their own rivals, thus speciously decreasing the 
effective extension of the competition”. Case law of the administrative courts has also pointed 
out the risks of a substantial distortion of the institute of the temporary association [45].
Also, in identifying one of the two criteria for the award, i.e. the lowest price and the economically 
most advantageous offer, it is necessary to guarantee (in addition to respect for the principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination and equal treatment) an assessment of the offers in a situation 
of effective competition.
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5. Conclusions
The law on public contracts has undergone a significant metamorphosis with the introduction 
of the principle and rules of free competition, sanctioned by the EC Treaty and by community 
law introduced into Italian law, most recently, with the Public Contract Code.
The “public evidence” procedures for the awarding of work, service and supply contracts no 
longer protect only the public, financial and administrative interests of the awarding bodies 
and do not only exclusively answer the principle of legality, but are aimed at guaranteeing 
the free circulation of goods and services on the domestic market and free competition at the 
European level.
The guarantee of a free market ensures the satisfaction of the public interest on both the finan-
cial and the administrative fronts, because effective competition limits prices and favours 
quality, since it can reward not only the less demanding contracting party but also the “fair” 
contracting party.
At the same time, the guarantee of a free market better satisfies the expectations and rights of the 
companies which, in the absence of effective competition, would risk suffering discrimination.
The logic of free competition at the European level requires the countries to have, as far as pos-
sible, the same laws to this regard. The said discipline in the Italian legal system is entrusted 
to the state in its capacity as legislator, to which the “protection of competition” is exclusively 
entrusted. This means that national law plays a very important role with regard to the essen-
tial legal features of public contracts.
Furthermore, the logic of competition brings with it an increase in the tools for guarantee 
available to the companies interested in the free market. This is the context of the Code, and 
in the light of this context, it must be interpreted and implemented.
In administrative law cases, public evidence procedures reinforce the remedies against discrimi-
nation, to the prejudice of the companies that are “new entries”, exercised by the contract-awarding 
bodies. The Public Contract Code places additional obligations on the contract-awarding bodies 
in order to ensure authentic equality of treatment also in new negotiating procedures, such as 
competitive dialogue. The authority’s role is consolidated in sector supervision, which moni-
tors, among other things, the correctness of the competitive procedures by means of a wide 
range of powers. Therefore, free competition reinforces the principle of legality.
At the same time, the antitrust remedies in favour of companies excluded or prejudice by the 
illegal behaviour of competitors are reinforced: there are an increasing number of cases in 
which the antitrust authority punishes restrictive agreements entered into by competitors in 
the execution of public tender procedures for the awarding of contracts.
In short, the logic of competition and the European free market has a duel value in the case 
of tender contracts: it more effectively contrasts the excesses of the powers of both national 
and local public bodies which operate as contract-awarding bodies and of the powers of the 
entrepreneurs that continue to stand in opposition.
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